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Abstract 
 
 
 
An examination of the religion of Islam and its unique characteristics, especially 
those that may relate to the politics and government of the Republic of Turkey, assist in 
understanding the relationship between the two. The 99% Muslim population affects the 
country politically and socially. There are many aspects of Sunni Islam, the majority in 
Turkey, that conflict with the secular nature of Turkey. Despite its apparent differences 
with the manner in which Turkey is governed, Islam has been able to exist in the country. 
Although religion is a personal matter, it becomes a concern if one is unable to practice it 
freely, which has been an issue in Turkey with the headscarf ban and many other reforms 
made at the formation of the republic. Ataturk was the great influence in Turkey’s major 
secular reforms, and it is these reforms of the past that create challenges today.  
This topic is important to the Pell Program because it concerns foreign 
policy and human rights. The paper will discuss the importance of religion in a 
democracy because although the two are meant to be separate, it is difficult to 
keep them completely apart. Turkey is an interesting combination of Muslim faith 
and democracy. It has been a great presence in the world in the past, and will 
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continue to be in the future. It is unique in its policies and customs, and has much 
to teach other nations of the world.  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
“If Muslims were to accept in principle the separation of religion from the domain of 
public life (which would then become secularized, as it has in the West to an even greater 
degree since the Renaissance), they would have to abandon the doctrine of Unity that lies 
at the heart of the Islamic message” (Nasr 113).  
Turkey is a secular state, as well as an Islamic one, and the religion has a strong 
presence in this unique country. It is important to understand the history of Islam and its 
central teachings in order to recognize its influence in Turkey, as well as its influence in 
the rest of the world. Islam is a monotheistic religion, similar in that respect to 
Christianity and Judaism, as all three religions are derived from the same beginnings. 
Islam began in the Arab world, and quickly spread to cover a great deal of Europe and 
Asia. Some arguments maintain that at the heart of the religion is the belief in Unity, 
community, and the Divine Law in all aspects of life, including politics and government. 
The religion, however, is far more complex and personal than one can learn from an 
outside perspective. History, personal experiences, location, and many other factors 
create variations in the religion. Turkey, being a secular government, has challenged the 
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message of Unity between religion and all aspects of public life that essentialist Islam 
stresses. There are some ways that Turkey’s government has been in opposition to certain 
essential beliefs of Sunni Islam, which is the religion of 99.8% of the country’s 
population of almost 77 million people (“Turkey”). While changes in Turkey conflict 
with certain traditions of Islam, they are beneficial to the country politically, and have 
created opportunities for growth and power. One may argue, however, that secularism 
can indeed support Islam, depending on the implication of each; or that Turkey is not 
truly democratic, depending on one’s perception.  
The four major concepts that shape Turkey’s character are Islam, secularism, 
nationality, and democracy. Islam affects Turkey through the people, while the 
government affects Turkey through secularism, democracy, and nationality. All are 
extremely different and while some may work together, others cannot. The quote above 
suggests that Islam itself cannot be secular; however, the religion has a different meaning 
to all followers, who should not be grouped into one category. One should not assume 
that all Muslims hold the same beliefs concerning Islam governing public life. In this 
sense, Islam can survive in a secular environment, and can be democratic. While Islam 
and democracy support each other, so do secularism and nationality. Ataturk, the creator 
of the secular Republic of Turkey, had a goal of creating a sense of nationality and along 
with it, a country of Turks. There is, however, a continuing problem of the Kurdish 
people in Turkey, who have their own sense of nationality. Although the concepts of 
Islam, democracy, secularism, and nationalism seem as though they could be vastly 
different, Turkey is an example of the four elements attempting to work together to form 
a successful nation.  
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History 
 
 
 
Sunni Islam 
The religion of Islam has a history that begins with the Prophet Muhammad. Born 
in Mecca in 570, he claimed to receive revelations from God over the course of many 
years. He later transcribed the revelations into what is known as the Quran, the most vital 
text in Islam. Another essential text of Islam is a compilation of Muhammad’s guidance 
and teachings called the Hadith, typically perceived as a guide for Muslims to live by. 
There are various adaptations and translations of the Hadith, and although it is not the 
word of God, followers revere it as an essential text to the religion. The Quran itself 
demands that all beings respect the prophet, giving the Hadith an even higher status. 
Though many translations use varying words, the Quran states that “God and His angels 
send blessings on the Prophet: O ye that believe! Send ye blessings on Him, and salute 
him with all respect” (“The Holy Quran – English Translation” 33:56). Also, “human 
beings can love God only if God loves them, and God loves only the person who loves 
His Prophet” (Nasr 47). These sources suggest that even though Muhammad is not 
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divine, since God chose him, others should venerate him, and his teachings ought to be 
followed. 
 Included in the Hadith are what are commonly known as the five pillars of Islam. 
These pillars include the following: stating that there is no God but God, and that 
Muhammad is His messenger; praying five times daily toward Mecca; giving charity to 
the less fortunate; fasting during Ramadan; and making the pilgrimage to Mecca if able. 
The Hadith also includes the tradition of wearing modest dress, which may include 
headscarves for women. It declares Friday as the day of rest, and states that worship 
should be in Arabic, as it was in Arabic that God supposedly recited the Quran to 
Muhammad. Once translated from Arabic, the Quran may possibly lose its true meaning.  
Muhammad gained a following of believers in Mecca, located in present day 
Saudi Arabia, and the religion began to spread. He moved to Medina in 622, also in Saudi 
Arabia, which is where the Prophet died and was buried in 632. The important pilgrimage 
to Mecca, one of the pillars of Islam, is done to recreate Muhammad’s move from one 
city to the other, known as the hajj. 
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Source: “Saudi Arabia” 
Islam continued after the Prophet’s death, but became divided into two major 
sections due to a debate over the successor of Muhammad. The Sunnis believe that Abu 
Bakr, the Prophet’s closest advisor, was the rightful successor of Muhammad, as the 
community elected him to rule. The Shiites, on the other hand, believe that Ali, the 
Prophet’s cousin, was to assume power, for he would continue the family lineage. Sunni 
Muslims make up the majority of the world’s Muslims, as well as the majority in Turkey, 
while the Shiites are the second largest group.  
There are two common views held by Muslims: the fundamentalist and the 
reformist, also called modernist. Muslim fundamentalists typically believe that religious 
law is superior to secular law, while modernists wish to synthesize “western 
philosophical and political thought, scientific-technological progress, and Islam” (Hafez 
6). A fundamentalist may believe his or her obedience lies primarily with God, next with 
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the Holy Prophet, and finally with an authoritative Muslim, as long as his actions are 
consistent with the Quran and the Prophet (Iqbal). According to this view, secular 
governments have little to no authority.  
The Quran does contain the concept of democracy, citizens must be consulted 
before any major decisions or policies are created. This could, however, be interpreted as 
consulting only with the elite, or another small portion of the citizenry (Price). The Quran 
also commands Muslims to assure religious freedom to all citizens in a secular state, and 
to protect the places of worship of all faiths (Iqbal). This evidence demonstrates that 
although some aspects of Islam may be in conflict with secularism, it does not conflict 
with democracy. In fact, the basis of Islam and democracy appear to be the same, as they 
both emphasize equality and freedom. 
 
 
  Ottoman Empire 
In the Sunni faith, the next elected caliph, or ruler, after Muhammad was Abu 
Bakr. Although he only ruled for two years beginning in 632, he made many 
contributions, such as controlling the tribal uprisings in Medina. The second caliph, 
Umar, came into power in 634, with an incentive to preserve Islam in an expanding 
empire (Nasr). Uthman followed in 644, although he was criticized for giving relatives 
political positions and an uprising resulted in his death. The next caliph was Ali in 656, 
who moved the capital outside of Arabia to Kufa (Nasr). Every leader had an impact on 
the empire, and each assisted in promoting Islam with an ultimate goal of expanding the 
empire.  
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The Ottoman Empire was a strong force in Islam, helping the religion to spread 
across much territory. It covered land from Algeria to Bosnia, and was the controlling 
force until World War I (Nasr). The Turkish leader Uthman, also known as Osman I, 
created the Empire in 1284. The Turks captured Constantinople in 1453 from the 
Byzantine Empire, and in 1930, the city was renamed Istanbul after the formation of the 
Republic of Turkey (Badertscher). Istanbul became a prominent city for the Islamic faith 
during the time-period. The city was in a prime location for trading, allowing many to 
pass through, which gave Islam an audience.  
The empire covered a great deal of territory, which included people of different 
faiths and backgrounds. This is why early leaders had to be tactful in how they went 
about governing their land, and whatever importance religion had in a local setting 
ultimately had to be about the state. The empire kept a separation between “religion as an 
institution and religion as a system of meanings and relations that connected a 
community of faith” (Barkey 10). Rulers used Islam as an institution to run the empire, 
and as a system of beliefs for personal practice. The rulers of the empire were aware that 
the state’s interests were not always the same as those of the religion, and they 
established a relationship between religion and politics rather than allowing one to 
overpower the other. The millet system was a “script for multi-religious rule,” based on 
borders between religious groups (Barkey 16). This allowed religions to prosper in their 
own areas, and was a display of the ultimate goal of toleration.   
The empire proved too large for its own good, however, and it fell largely due to 
its size and economic instability. After World War I, the Ottoman Empire was defeated 
and partitioned into separate nation states, mainly under British and French control. The 
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sultanate was officially eliminated in 1922, putting an end to the empire (“Ottoman 
Empire (1301-1922)”). In the following year, Mustafa Kemal stepped in as ruler of the 
new republic. 
 
 
  Ataturk  
When Mustafa Kemal, also referred to as Ataturk or “Father of the Turks,” 
created the Republic of Turkey in 1923, he focused on reforms that would separate the 
religious beliefs of Turks from public life. Turkey went from being the most powerful 
Islamic state in Asia after the Ottoman Empire, to being marginalized in Europe 
presently, as Europe does not yet fully accept them as an equal. At the same time, 
however, Turkey is becoming a model in the Middle East because of their successful 
negotiations with Europe.  
Mustafa Kemal was born in 1881 in modern day Greece, coming from a humble 
family in what could be considered the “European part of the Empire”; a mix of Greeks, 
Turks, Christians, Muslims, and Jews (Rustow 815). Ataturk had a history in the military, 
and goals of creating a republic. A prominent general in the Ottoman army, Kemal was 
also the youngest to hold a high rank, and the only high-ranking general of Turkish 
nationality to remain in Turkey after the fall of the empire (Rustow). He defeated British 
attempts to gain control of Istanbul in 1920, giving him diplomatic recognition and 
allowing his government to gain control of the area (Rustow). Many Middle Eastern 
states wanted to gain English support, but Ataturk did not see the British as allies. He had 
the desire to have an independent state, with strong leadership and individual support. 
This excerpt of Kemal’s 1919 speech in Ankara demonstrates his belief in sovereignty: 
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Today the nations of the whole world recognize only one sovereignty: 
national sovereignty. If we now look at the other details of the 
organization - we begin our work from the village and the neighborhood 
and from the people of the neighborhood, that is, from the individual…To 
be able to save himself, every individual must become personally 
concerned with his destiny…it must be considered a national and patriotic 
duty that we should make great efforts especially to attain the goal of a 
structuring from below upward (Rustow 807).  
Ataturk wanted to create a completely independent and cohesive state, not at all similar to 
the Ottoman Empire. While the empire focused on expansion and inclusion of many 
cultures and religions, Turkey would form a country with borders and a sense of 
nationality. Ataturk based his new republic on “nationalism, secularism, reformism, 
statism, populism, and republicanism” (Ansary 302). His government removed religion 
from the education system and the courts and began using a more modern, secular 
system. The Turks took their penal code from Italy, the Code of Obligations from the 
Swiss, and they adopted a German Commercial Code (Jenkins). There was a state-drafted 
version of Islam in schools; children under fifteen were able to learn the Quran in the 
summer only, while children under twelve were completely banned from having lessons 
in the Quran (Kuru).  
Ataturk forbade polygamy and gave women equal rights in the area of divorce 
and marriage, along with the right to vote and own property. Kemal held the belief that 
“to keep women secluded is to waste one half of Turkey’s most precious resource,” and  
this was shown in his personal life, as his wife Latife took part in dinnertime debates and 
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did not wear a veil (Rustow 816). He strongly encouraged the education of women, and 
saw this as a truly important step to becoming modern. As of 2004, the literacy rate of the 
total population of Turkey is 87.4%; about 95% of men are able to read while almost 80 
percent of women are literate (“Turkey”). Women of present day Turkey are quickly 
approaching the level of the men, due in large part to the efforts put forth by Ataturk.  
Similar to Christian and European states, Sunday became the day of rest, rather 
than the traditional Islamic Friday, making Turkey the only Muslim state to do this. They 
also began using the Gregorian calendar rather than the hijri, the typical Islamic calendar, 
and changed script from Arabic to Latin (Landau). Turkish was typically written in 
Arabic so this was quite a dramatic change. All languages other than Turkish were 
abandoned to help promote nationalism through single language usage. He had a goal to 
remove the power from the ulama, the Islamic scholars and leaders, and to manage 
society in a secular fashion (Ansary). Although these changes were difficult to enforce in 
small towns and rural areas, their presence was evident. The transfer of the capital city 
from Istanbul, which was principally Islamic, to Ankara, a city without a strong Islamic 
background was also a dramatic alteration. Ataturk’s government was based in Ankara, 
giving the city importance to him.  
Kemal chose to call his reforms by tactful names, for example, “He spoke of the 
international, not the Christian, calendar; of the Turkish, not the Swiss, civil code; of the 
Turkish, not the Latin, alphabet; of civilized, not European, dress” (Rustow 813). This 
had the effect of creating a sense of unity and nationality rather than the feeling of 
separation or disorder. Author Dankwart Rustow also had the belief that Kemal cared 
more for cultural matters than other problems such as the economy. This had value, 
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though, since reforms in dress, such as the abolition of the fez, made it more difficult to 
distinguish a person’s social class or religion at first glance.  
These reforms, though official, did not completely abolish many traditional 
Muslim laws. Especially in rural areas, laws in terms of marriage, divorce, inheritance, 
and child custody continued as usual for Muslims (Yilmaz). In the 2002 article “Secular 
Law and the Emergence of Unofficial Turkish Islamic Law,” the author discusses how 
Islam has remained in the public life of Turkish citizens despite Ataturk’s reformations. 
In the area of marriage, Ataturk’s reforms deemed religious ceremonies as optional, and 
without official registration, were criminal. Talaq, or “religious divorce,” was not 
recognized either. Many traditional Muslims, however, regarded the religious wedding 
ceremony as binding, and believed that official recognition was unnecessary. People did 
seem to realize, though, that “marrying religiously only has disadvantages, whilst having 
married secularly in addition to the religious marriage has substantial benefits” (Yilmaz 
123). By performing both rather than one opposed to the other, Muslims were able to 
maintain their religious traditions and at the same time, please their government. 
Religious laws can adapt to the secular system rather than being replaced by it, showing 
that “state law has limits to shape the society” and that “Turkish people by and large have 
harmonized the elements of democracy and Islam and have also shown that these two are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive” (Yilmaz 131). Marriage, along with other aspects of 
Muslim life, is an example of the way in which religious practices and secular law are 
able to function together.  
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Conflicting Identities 
 
The Republic of Turkey has two strong identities that do conflict with one 
another. The Islamic identity is meaningful in the lives of the Muslim population, while 
at the same time there is a European identity that the Turkish government has been 
striving toward since the founding of the Republic. Geographically, a small portion of 
Turkey, near Istanbul, is in close proximity to Europe, while the majority of the country 
is part of Asia, or the Middle East. This creates conflict within Turkey, since the country 
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has the ability to relate to either one side or the other. The discrepancy lies in the idea that 
while individuals may feel a connection to their roots, in particular the Islamic roots, the 
government, or those in charge, will encourage the connection with Europe in hopes of 
modernization.  
 
 
Source: “Turkey” 
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Source: “European Union”  
 
Muslim Identity 
Traditions and beliefs of Islam give Turkey a strong connection to its Middle 
Eastern identity and history, considering that the other countries within the Middle East 
are majority Muslim populations as well. During the rise of Islam, Turkey was at the 
heart of the Ottoman Empire, and a great influence to other Islamic states. This gives the 
country a role in Islamic history that cannot be forgotten. Turkey does seem to be 
developing a strong European identity, however, and the Turkish government strengthens 
this identity by supporting the efforts to enter into the European Union.   
Over the course of Turkey’s history, the government has challenged many 
traditional Islamic beliefs and practices, causing more tension between Islam and 
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secularism. An important issue that has been present in Turkey is the ban on the turban, 
or headscarf, in public Turkish institutions. Religious dress is an important aspect of 
Islam that is the center of much controversy in Turkey. Many Muslim women consider 
the headscarf as a symbol of faith, and prohibiting this choice of clothing inhibits the 
personal freedoms of the women of Turkey. In numerous Muslim countries, such as 
Afghanistan, women are required to cover their heads, while a 2004 survey in Turkey 
found that about 61% of women chose to cover their heads despite the ban (Kuru). 
Another study found that between 1999 and 2006, the percentage of women wearing a 
head covering decreased from almost 70% to about 60%, although 64% of people 
surveyed were under the impression that the wearing of a headscarf had increased during 
this period. Author Murat Somer argues, “People notice headscarf-wearing women more 
because of their fear of Islamisation” (Somer 1278). The turban does have an Islamic 
connotation, and people do notice its presence.  
As of February 9, 2008, the Turkish government lifted the headscarf ban. 
Restrictions do remain for “more rigidly Islamic attire - veils that cover all of the hair and 
neck of the face, or cloaks that cover the body – in public offices”, as the government 
only allows scarves tied under the chin, being traditionally Turkish and not Islamic 
(Ayman). The Constitutional Court responded to this debate, stating that the ease on 
scarves at University “violated the constitution’s secular principles” and the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), “which was re-elected last year with a convincing 47% of the 
vote, says it is a matter of personal and religious freedom” (“Court Annuls Turkish Scarf 
Reform” 1).  
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The various reforms in worship are also contentious issues, putting Islam in 
opposition with the secular government. Arabic is an extremely important language to the 
Islamic faith, because many believe that it was in Arabic that God conveyed his message, 
which was compiled into the Quran. Many essentialist teachings of Islam take the stand 
that the Quran should not be translated from Arabic because it is the word of God (Nasr). 
For much time, though, worship in Turkey has been moving away from the traditional 
ways and into a more modern state. In 1928, the Darulfunun School of Theology 
attempted to reform worship by suggesting that the Quran be recited in Turkish rather 
than Arabic. This does allow citizens to understand, giving opportunities to those who do 
not have the means to learn Arabic to participate in religious activities. The school also 
wanted to allow shoes in mosques when typically there are no shoes permitted (Aydar). 
Many people did protest these attempts at reform, while others simply did not adhere to 
them. These issues do challenge some traditions in the faith, leaving stress on the 
government to determine its limits.  
In February of 2008, the Department of Religious Affairs in Turkey decided to 
revise and reinterpret the Hadith, the collection of proverbs from the Prophet 
Muhammad. Many Turkish officials belief the Hadith influences society negatively, as it 
is a hindrance to modernization. In fact, some believe many sayings were not even those 
of the Prophet himself. Professor Mehmet Gormez of the Department of Religious 
Affairs gives the example of one rule that states that women should not travel alone 
without a husband’s permission. The saying was accepted because “in the Prophet's time 
it simply wasn't safe for a woman to travel alone like that. But as time has passed, people 
have made permanent what was only supposed to be a temporary ban for safety reasons” 
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(Pigott 1). Professor Gormez believes this saying was only intended to be followed 
temporarily since in another passage of the Hadith, the Prophet declared his desire for 
“the day when a woman might travel long distances alone” (Pigott 1). It is arguable that 
passages such as this should indeed be updated since they are no longer relevant, and may 
even improve upon the treatment of women in many areas. Conversely, the Turkish 
expert Fadi Hakura argues that the revisions of the Hadith are only to “serve the needs of 
people in a modern secular democracy,” and that Turkey is “trying to fashion a new 
Islam” (Pigott 1). Hakura understands that reinterpreting religious texts is not a radical 
concept, but “the way Turkey is carrying it out in a systematic fashion is quite 
revolutionary” (Saidazimova 1). Religious texts have been reinterpreted and clarified in 
the past, but some argue that Turkey’s Department of Religious Affairs is taking it too 
far. 
Supposedly, these changes in the Hadith are not so much a revision as a 
classification to clarify the text for a better understanding. Bunyamin Erul, one of the 
project members, explains that the team is attempting to “explain these sayings based on 
the rules of knowledge of the Hadith in a new style and with some new methodology” 
(Saidazimova 1). The adjustments seem to be historically accurate and professional, and 
there have been many other interpretations of the Hadith in the past. One Muslim cleric, 
Obidkhon Qori Nazarov, states “The Koran and hadiths have been commented on and 
interpreted since they were revealed. Commenting and interpreting them in a given 
historical context can happen anytime and is nothing unusual” (Saidazimova 1). The 
main goal of the project appears to have completely genuine intentions of allowing the 
Hadith to be more relevant in today’s society. If certain Muslims do not agree with the 
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changes made, they would be likely to choose a translation or version of the Hadith that 
is more fitting to their individual preferences.  
 
  European Identity 
Through the reformations of Ataturk’s government, Turkey has established a 
European identity through shared interests and similar customs with the countries of 
Europe. The government of Turkey has a mindset geared toward the European system, as 
there are continued attempts to enter into the European Union (EU). Being in the EU has 
many advantages, including free travel and trade, a single currency, higher living 
standards, and job and school opportunities (“Europa: Gateway to the European Union”). 
These benefits offered by the EU are quite attractive for Turkey, along with the general 
support and sense of community being a member of the EU would bring.  
Being a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also gives 
Turkey something in common with many other members of the EU, as there are only two 
nations in the EU that are not in NATO (Austria and Ireland). This could possibly assist 
Turkey in its endeavors toward EU membership. Many United States and British 
newspapers already consider Turkey as part of Europe. For example, the online versions 
of the New York Times and BBC list Turkey under the Europe section, rather than the 
Middle East section (BBC, New York Times). According to the CIA World Factbook, 
however, Turkey is listed as a Middle Eastern country. These observations are interesting 
because it demonstrates that Turkey is indeed making progress toward assimilating itself 
within Europe, and this helps to strengthen its European identity. It also verifies, 
however, that Turkey does indeed have a conflict of identities.  
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The EU does have many concerns for the admission of Turkey into the union. 
Many of the reforms made throughout Turkey’s history in hopes of modernizing are the 
traits that the EU may not accept. For example, the EU is concerned with a particular 
article in the Turkish penal code, which limits “freedom of expression by criminalizing 
remarks that are perceived to insult ‘Turkishness’, Turkey or its institutions” (“Monthly 
Review” 1). There is also the question of what the possibility of a majority Muslim 
community entering the union means for the EU and even the US, because this in turn 
affects Turkey’s opportunities. Romano Prodi, in his lecture at Salve Regina University, 
mentioned the unique situation of Turkey. He pointed out that the Turkish parliament 
would be a very large addition to the union, giving it a great presence and an important 
role for a new member of the union. Prodi described the EU as a “union of minorities,” 
and that the states surrounding the union are considered a “ring of friends,” sharing 
everything but institutions. Since negotiations with the EU began, however, Turkey no 
longer sees itself as just a friend.  
The EU should also concern itself with the economy of Turkey, as the GDP of 
Turkey is lower than most countries in the EU. While a 2008 estimate found Turkey’s 
GDP at about US$900 billion, European countries such as Spain and Italy are over US$1 
trillion, and France and the United Kingdom are over US$2 trillion (“Turkey”). In order 
for the Turkish economy to be successful and compatible within the European Union, it 
would be reasonable for the country to be at the same economic level as other European 
countries.  
In order to obtain EU membership, Turkey is required to fulfill the requirements 
of the Copenhagen European Council, which include “ensuring the stability of 
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institutions, guaranteeing complete freedom of expression, human rights, respect and 
protection for minorities and an efficient market economy” (Cizre 223). One example in 
particular was the consideration of permitting Kurdish broadcasting and education. Some 
argue, however, that these freedoms should only be permitted if they do not “inflame 
Kurdish claims and revive political Islam” (Cizre 224). If this fear persists, it would be 
difficult for Turks to demonstrate their acceptance of the Kurds. 
Issues such as these are important for Turkish political figures, especially those in 
the Justice and Development Party. In 2003, Abdullah Gul, at the time Prime Minister, 
strongly emphasized democratic reforms. His party views the potential EU acceptance as 
a way to ensure political and economic growth and stability as well as an increase in 
religious freedom (Cizre). Despite their commitment to democracy, the AKP has shown 
some tendencies to be critical of EU agendas that seemed to protect secularist interests 
over Islamic interests, concerning the secularists. For example, when the European Court 
of Human Rights turned down an application against the headscarf ban, and when the EU 
pressured the AKP to remove their proposal to criminalize adultery (Somer). The EU 
candidacy, however, has given Turkey guidelines to assist in further reformation, and an 
opportunity to refocus their interests. 
 
  Government’s Position 
These conflicting identities within Turkey put the government in a difficult 
position, and the current President of Turkey, Abdullah Gul, has a strong Islamist 
background, which is quite a change in Turkey. The President claims, however, that he is 
working toward EU membership and other democratic reforms. Interestingly, President 
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Gul’s wife Hayrunnisa wears a headscarf, which remains a public issue though the ban no 
longer exists (“Profile: Abdullah Gul”). Many secularists perceive the turban as being in 
“opposition to Ataturk’s secular reforms” and “the country’s first lady wearing it would 
symbolize a major shift of power in society” (Somer 1275). Her headscarf has also been a 
personal issue for Hayrunnisa Gul. In 1988, Ankara University refused her admission for 
wearing her headscarf, and she is not invited to official receptions at Cankaya 
Presidential Palace because of her turban. Hayrunnisa faced this issue stating; “I believe 
that it will be tackled as Turkey becomes more mature” (“Hayrunnisa Gul” 1).  
Before his election to presidency, when Abdullah Gul served as the foreign 
minister of Turkey in 2007, he published an article on the importance of Turkey as an 
ally to the United States. He explains that Turkey is vital in creating long-term stability 
within regions such as Europe or the Middle East, and that it shares the values of peace 
and democracy with the United States. Gul discusses the two-state solution for Israel and 
Palestine that the US and Turkey both seek, as well as the desire for peace and stability in 
Iraq. He firmly believes that Turkey and the US hold the same ideals, he states  
I sincerely believe that although the Turkish–American partnership is 
essential in promoting global peace and security, the more important 
aspect is the great promise it holds. More specifically, the founding ideals 
of America and the example wrought by the Republic of Turkey in 
confronting modernity in a traditionalist society run parallel to, not 
against, each other (Gul 180). 
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It is clear that Gul’s policies have a similar basis to those of the United States. However, 
Gul has received, and continues to receive, much criticism for his traditionalist Islamic 
past.  
Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan also has a past in political Islam. 
Many consider his ideas to be controversial, and perhaps too “Islamic” for a secular 
government. For example, in 2004 he pushed to make adultery a crime, which the 
European Union did not agree with. In 2005, when The European Court of Human Rights 
“decided against permitting head scarves in Turkish universities, he declared that ‘only 
ulama could’ make this decision” (Solmazturk 67). Since Prime Minister Erdogan at 
times disagrees with Europe’s wishes, and wants to rely on the ulama, “Islamic scholars,” 
for decisions, many secularists question his objectives. In fact, in March of 2008, secular 
establishments in Turkey sought to shut down Erdogan’s political party, the Justice and 
Development Party, or the AKP, for “antisecular activities” and restrict both the Prime 
Minister and President Gul from politics for at least five years (Tavernise “Suit Seeks to 
Bar Party of Premier”). Although this has yet to occur, it displays the great tensions 
between secularism and Islam in Turkish government. 
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Islam, Democracy, and Secularism 
 
In April of 2009, President of the United States, Barak Obama, visited Turkey in 
order to demonstrate that the United States is able to have positive relations with a 
majority Muslim country. A New York Times article states, “Turkey is crucial to 
American interests on many fronts. It borders Iraq and Iran; it has deep influence in 
Afghanistan; and it is helping efforts to forge a peace deal between Israel and Syria” and 
that “Mr. Obama also seemed to be pushing for more acceptance of the separation of 
religion and the state” (Cooper 1). Some see Turkey as the model for other Islamic 
countries to follow if they are to become modern, democratic, and secular. 
The idea of a secular democracy is vague, though, because in a democracy, 
religious citizens are likely to vote with influence from their belief system. The definition 
of democracy, as given by the Cambridge Dictionary, is “the belief in freedom and 
equality between people, or a system of government based on this belief, in which power 
is either held by elected representatives or directly by the people themselves” 
(“Democracy” 1). The definition of secularism is “the belief that religion should not be 
involved with the ordinary social and political activities of a country” (“Secularism” 1). If 
a country is a secular democracy, however, the people who are electing their 
representatives are quite likely to be influenced by their religious beliefs, meaning that 
religion is inevitably involved in the country’s politics. This idea suggests that 
individuals affect the politics of a state. Islam and democracy are able to co-exist through 
the unity of people’s beliefs and what is best for the state, since it is the people 
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themselves determine the fate of their country. According to this notion, Islam and 
secularism are incompatible, because religion can never be fully removed from the social 
and political life of a country. It is possible, however, that one may interpret the meaning 
of secularism differently. In Turkey, for example, secularism may indicate that Islam 
should no longer be the deciding factor in the country’s politics; however, it will always 
be present and significant in the lives of its citizens. Each political party may have a 
different concept of secularism as well. While secularists may emphasize the “separation 
of religion and state,” Islamists may emphasize the idea of “freedom of religion” (Somer 
1280). While both parties are likely to believe they support secularism, they may not 
agree on its definition. 
Turkey is likely to thrive with support from other strong nations, as long as the 
needs and desires of the population are considered. One author in particular points out the 
debate that secularization may be placing “limits on freedom of religion in the name of 
protecting the public order.” He believes, however, that the majority of Turks consider 
“religion, democracy, and secularism compatible with each other” (Bardakoglu 122). 
These concepts should be compatible as long as they are equally and affectively 
considered. It is argued that “Islam’s inherent concepts and values provide a strong base 
for democratic governance” and “Muslim societies look to legitimize their 
transformations into democratic modes of governance, while maintaining openness 
toward the religious values” (Ozler 1). If the Turkish government preserves the integrity 
of its people, Islam should pose no threat to a democratic nation. Another source points 
out that the “Turkish experience shows that compatibility between Islam and democracy 
can only be achieved through the politics of moderation” (Ghanim 77). In other words, as 
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long as secularism and democracy do not impede on religion in the personal life, they can 
be harmonious. A democracy can have some sort of control to ensure that an individual’s 
personal religious rights are not threatened.  
Author Ahmet Kuru believes that secularism does not need to be imposed upon 
citizens; rather people should accept it as the national governance, not an alternative to 
religion. The Turkish constitutional court has claimed that Islam has public aims, but that 
secularism is not so much the separation of religion and state but the separation of 
religion and worldly affairs (Kuru). Through this definition, religion and secularism have 
no divergences. Religion can retain its role in an individual’s personal life while 
remaining outside of the public realm, for the most part. Some argue, however, that a 
distinction between religion and state cannot exist in Islam, while others believe that the 
two have been separated since the eighth century (Kuru). This difference in opinion 
supports the idea that religion is dependent upon personal opinion and beliefs, and that 
many people can interpret it differently.  
While religion can vary from person to person within the state, the government of 
Turkey must be suitable for all its citizens, Muslim or not. Living within the borders of 
Turkey gives citizens a Turkish identity and sense of nationality, but they are not 
necessarily all Muslim. Although 99.8% of the population is Muslim, the religion has 
varying levels of importance for everyone. Within Islam, Sunnis and Shiites share 
different values and traditions, but living in Turkey, they share a sense of nationality. The 
Kurds, however, do present an issue with nationalism, as the common belief is that they 
do not feel Turkish, rather the Kurds want to maintain their own Kurdish nationality. 
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Islam and democracy should not be in competition with each other, rather the two 
should be able to co-exist. Many pro-democracy Muslims believe “the modern ideals of 
equality, freedom, and democracy are not uniquely Western values, but modern 
necessities compatible with, and even required by, Muslim ideals” (Hefner 498). The 
concept of democracy itself has no conflict with Islam; rather it is the idea of secularism 
in the sense that religion is completely removed from public life, as a country should 
embrace the religion of its citizens. For democratic Islam to be a success, however, there 
must be a “delicate balance between structural changes in state and society, on one hand, 
and public culture and ethics, on the other” (Hefner 500). According to this, every part of 
society must put forth efforts in order to be successful, and one area cannot overtake 
another.  
Islam can and should be able to support democracy, and vice versa. Many 
religious groups use democracy in order to expand their institutions and gain support in 
politics. Islamists are gaining more power through the spread of knowledge, and using 
this education to “challenge the negative labels of the secularists. They are able to 
promote Islam as a positive force and enhance its value as ‘ideological capital’” (Sutton 
77). Islam is able to continue to gain power through knowledge.  
Becoming a secular state with an Islamic population is possible because religion 
and the state are similar in their processes. For example, Iran has radical traits but also 
maintains many Western concepts, such as “constitutionalism, parliamentarianism, 
technology, and industry” (Hafez 5). On the other hand, Iran does seem to be an example 
of Islam’s incompatibility with democracy because of its connection with disorder and 
extremism, leaving Islam with the label of a “dangerous and regressive force” (Price 
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124). In Iran, Islam spreading through knowledge came into play during the revolution 
from 1977 to 1979. More education about Islam caused social movement and a need for 
political participation (Price). Islam in Iran is unique, though, since the ulama remain 
separate from the government, receiving private funding (Price). However, every state 
has a unique relationship between religion and government, and Islam has shown its 
ability to exist with democracy in Turkey.  
 
Resurgent Islam and the Kurds 
In 2002, The Justice and Development Party in Turkey won the majority in 
elections, despite being new as well as somewhat “Islamist.” Erdogan, currently Prime 
Minister, served as the leader of the AKP during the 2002 campaign. However, he could 
not be elected into parliament as the Constitutional Court banned him due to accusations 
of Islamist objectives. He wanted the party to “serve as a bridge between traditional and 
modernizing Turkey” with a goal of appealing to the average, modern citizen, with a 
clear agenda of admission into the EU (Mecham 351). According to the AKP, “true 
secularism meant no state interference in religious practice” (Mecham 351). They wanted 
to maintain religious institutions within a secular society, seemingly a benefit for both 
Muslims and secularists. Other religious political parties, such as the Felicity party, used 
tactics that displayed opposition to the government and Western practices, leaving them 
with a less diverse following. Many leaders of the Felicity party were also linked to 
former conservative Islamist parties, giving them an unfavorable association.  
The AKP used moderation and smart tactics to lead them to success. They did not 
openly challenge the military, a number of women were active in the party, and 
Secularization and Islam in Turkey 30 
 
democracy was their main motivation. “AKP leaders recognized that, if they could strike 
the fine balance between behaving like a religious protest party and brandishing secular 
credentials, their potential constituency greatly expanded” (Mecham 354). The party was 
successful in reaching many different audiences by using religion to support secularism 
rather than choosing between the two.  
Current President of Turkey Abdullah Gul faced opposition by the secularists in 
2007 when he was nominated for the presidency. It would be the first time since the 
founding of the republic that the secularists did not maintain control. In the first round of 
voting, Gul would need to win 367 votes in the 550-member Parliament, of which 341 
members were of his own party (Tavernise, “Turkish Presidential Pick” 1). Gul’s 
imminent win was indeed unsettling for secularists, but his party was fully involved in 
modernization, in particular sustaining talks with the EU.  
Although it may not have been completely warranted, the past political life of Mr. 
Gul did concern the secularist parties. In 1991, Gul ran for Parliament as a member of the 
Welfare Party, which was openly Islamist. A professor at Bilkent University, Metin 
Heper, suggests that Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan “want to build a strong economy 
and healthy society, and that Islam is a moral compass to achieve it”, and that the two 
“thought religion would be a source for the internalization of such values and attitudes” 
(Tavernise, “Religious Candidate Is Ascendant” 1). It could be argued that the reasoning 
behind Gul’s policies does not matter as much as what he truly achieves. Although Islam 
has been important in Gul’s personal existence as well as his political career, this does 
not suggest that his party is undermining the secularist history of the country. Rather, the 
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AKP supports secularism in the sense that while Islam is a presence in society, it is not 
the determining factor in politics. 
 Gul’s platform for presidency emphasized secularism and the desire for EU 
membership. In August of 2007, Abdullah Gul won the presidency in Turkey, and in his 
acceptance speech in Parliament he stated; “secularism, one of the basic principles of our 
republic, is a rule of social peace” (Tavernise, “Turk With Islamic Ties” 1). He supports 
the foundations of the country, while he also appears to maintain his personal faith. It 
appears that Gul’s view of secularism is strictly political, meaning that Islam should not 
determine the government. Although Gul’s political past was principally Islamic, his 
outlook for the future and his actions are the truly important factors. 
Currently, the power of the AKP has come into question, specifically how the 
party’s foreign policy affects the country. The concern over the party’s Islamic ties 
continues to be an issue, as well as whether it can coincide with the secular fundamentals. 
The military seems to be at odds with the AKP at times, as it holds strong secularist 
beliefs. In addition, the AKP has worked with the military in its policies towards the 
Kurdish people. The AKP has engaged the Kurdistan Regional Government to open 
dialogue with the Iraqi Kurds, while also combating the PKK, a rebel group of Turkish 
Kurds (Abramowitz). Erdogan has plans to create new policies toward the Kurds living 
within Turkey, though any political moves made are likely to be thoroughly scrutinized 
and analyzed.  
In November of 2009, the Turkish government announced plans for granting 
Kurdish rights. Comprising about 18% of the population of Turkey, Kurds are a strong 
presence, yet have few rights within the country. In 2008, Parliament did legalize private 
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language courses in Kurdish, as well as the first Kurdish public television (“Turkey and 
the Kurds”). Currently, Parliament is considering the use of Kurdish in media and 
political campaigns, the restoration of the original Kurdish names of thousands of towns, 
and the establishment of anti-discrimination committees (“Turkey and the Kurds”). Such 
reforms would greatly benefit the Turkish government, would promote a positive image 
for the AKP, and may even improve the country’s status with the EU.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
As shown through the example of Turkey, secularization can bring about great 
political and economic success. Under the government of the AKP, there was political 
stability due to a single party government, an average annual growth of 7.3 percent 
between 2002 and 2006, and some forms of teaching and broadcasting in Kurdish. “All 
these reforms moved Turkey closer to Western standards and increased the world’s 
confidence in Turkey’s democracy and economy” (Somer 1279).  
Turkey has been successful in approaching the concept of modernity as seen by 
“westerners,” while some argue that at the same time, this causes a movement further 
from the fundamental Islamic idea of modern, which is essentially the Divine Law. As 
one source points out,  
What is it that orders or forces the times to change as they do? 
Islam believes that the factor to make the times and coordinate 
human society must be the Shari’ah (Divine Law). Human beings 
must seek to live according to the Will of God as embodied in the 
Shari’ah and not change the Law of God according to the changing 
patterns of a society based on the impermanence of human nature 
(Nasr 80).  
According to this opinion, the Divine Law determines the modern world, and 
should not be altered based on current standards, which are not eternal. On the other 
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hand, Edward Said, author of Covering Islam, views this as a generalization. He believes 
that a perception such as this assumes that all Muslims accept and understand the concept 
of Divine Law; when in reality, Islam does not define the Islamic world. Said argues that 
Islam can, in fact, separate mosque and state, and to say that it cannot ignores history and 
makes the leap from Islam as abstract to a complex reality. Islam is far more elaborate 
and obscure than one can explain in simple terms, and it cannot have a general definition. 
Islam can exist in Turkey because it is not restricted by secularism and democracy. 
The government in Turkey has a large role in how Turks perceive Islam. In a 
2007 article, Murat Somer argues that the AKP is a moderate Islamic party, and would be 
most successful if they are “checked and balanced by strong secularist political parties” 
(1274). He believes this would allow Islamic conservatives to have equal opportunity to 
come to power through democratic processes rather than through Islamic radicalism. The 
AKP has the ability to become an example of Islam existing with “secular, multiparty 
democracy” (Somer 1276). The party does not oppose religion, although it does regulate 
it. However, the AKP is not fully committed to either secularism or Islamism, which may 
cause conservative Islamic followers to be reluctant to continue their support. The 
performance of this political party will have a great influence on the future of Turkey, as 
it displays a moderate Islam balanced by secularist opposition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Secularization and Islam in Turkey 35 
 
 
 
 
 
Works Cited  
 
Abramowitz, Morton, and Henri J. Barkey. “Turkey's Transformers.” Foreign Affairs 
88.6 (2009). Academic Search Complete. Web. 12 Nov. 2009. 
Ansary, Tamim. Destiny Disrupted: A History of the World Through Islamic Eyes. New 
York: Public Affairs, 2009. Print.  
Aydar, Hidayet. “Attemps at Reform in Worship: The Example of Turkey.” Ekev 
Akademi Dergisi 10 (2006): 1-12.  
Ayman, Zehra, and Ellen Knickmeyer. “Ban on Head Scarves Voted Out in Turkey.” The 
Washington Post 10 Feb. 2008. 10 June 2009  
Badertscher, Eric. “Chapter One: Background & Origins.” Ottoman Empire (2009): 1. 
EBSCOhost. Web. 6 Oct. 2009.  
Bardakoglu, Ali. “Culture of Co-Existence in Islam: The Turkish Case.” Insight Turkey 
10 (2008): 111-26. 
Barkey, Henri J., and Yasemin Congar. “Deciphering Turkey's Elections: The Making of 
a Revolution.” World Policy Journal 24 (2007): 63-73. Academic Search 
Complete. EBSCOhost. McKillop, Newport. 
Cizre, Umit. “Demythologyzing the National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey.” 
Middle East Journal 57.2 (2003): 213-29. JSTOR. Web. 21 Oct. 2009.  
Cooper, Helene. “America Seeks Bonds to Islam, Obama Insists.” The New York Times.  
08 Apr. 2009  
Secularization and Islam in Turkey 36 
 
“Court Annuls Turkish Scarf Reform.” BBC News. 5 June 2008. 9 July 2009  
“Democracy.” Cambridge Dictionary Online. Web. 04 Nov. 2009.  
Europa: Gateway to the European Union. 9 July 2009  
“European Union.” CIA - The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency, 27 Nov. 
2009. Web. 09 Dec. 2009.  
Ghanim, David. “Turkish Democracy and Political Islam.” Middle East Policy 16 (2009): 
75-84. Academic Search Complete. EBSCOhost. McKillop, Newport. 
Gul, Abdullah. “Turkey: Vital Ally in the Cause of Long-Term Stability.” American 
Foreign Policy Interests 29 (2007): 175-81. JSTOR. Web. 21 Oct. 2009. 
Hafez, Kai. Islamic World and the West: An Introduction to Political Cultures and 
International Relations. Brill, N.H.E.J., N.V. Koninklijke, Boekhandel en 
Drukkerij, 2000. Ebrary. Web. 22 Oct. 2009.  
“Hayrunnisa Gul: The next first lady.” Today's Zaman 25 Apr. 2007. 10 June 2009  
Hefner, Robert W. “Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization.” Sociology of 
Religion 62.4 (2001): 491-514. JSTOR. Web. 14 Oct. 2009.  
 “The Holy Quran - English Translation.” Jannah.Org, Islam the Eternal Path to Peace. 
Web. 30 Sept. 2009. 
Iqbal, Javid. Chapter 13: Democracy and the Modern Islamic State. Ed. John L. 
Esposito. New York: Oxford UP, Inc., 1983. Print. 
Jenkins, Gareth. Political Islam in Turkey: Running West, Heading East? New York: 
Palgrave Macmillam, 2008. 
Kuru, Ahmet T. “Secularism in Turkey: Myths and Realities.” Insight Turkey 10 (2008): 
101-10. 
Secularization and Islam in Turkey 37 
 
Landau, Jacob M. “Turkey Between Secularism and Islamism” Jerusalem Center for 
Public Affairs. 05 Mar. 2009  
Mecham, R. Quinn. “From the Ashes of Virtue, a Promise of Light: The Transformation 
of Political Islam in Turkey.” Third World Quarterly 25.2 (2004): 339-58. 
JSTOR. Web. 21 Oct. 2009.  
“Monthly Review.” (2008). 2008. Economist Intelligence Unit. 25 Feb. 2009  
Nasr, Seyyed H. Islam: Religion, History, and Civilization. New York: Harper San 
Francisco.  
“Ottoman Empire (1301-1922).” Religion and Ethics - Islam. BBC. Web. 14 Oct. 2009.  
Ozler, Hayrettin, and Ergun Yildirim. “Islam and Democracy: A False Dichotomy.” 
Insight Turkey 10 (2008): 87-99. 
Pigott, Robert. “Turkey in Radical Revision of Islamic Texts.” BBC News. 26 Feb. 2008. 
Web. 27 Oct. 2009.  
Price, Daniel E. Islamic Political Culture, Democracy and Human Rights: A 
Comparative Study. Greenwood Group, Incorporated, 1999. Ebrary. Web. 22 Oct. 
2009.  
Prodi, Romano. “Can Europe Change the World?” Bazarsky Lecture Hall, Newport. 21 
Oct. 2009. Lecture.  
“Profile: Abdullah Gul.” BBC News. 05 Mar. 2009  
Rustow, Dankwart A. “Ataturk as Founder of a State.” Daedalus 97.3 (1968): 793-828. 
JSTOR. Web. 6 Oct. 2009.  
Secularization and Islam in Turkey 38 
 
Said, Edward W. Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We 
See the Rest of the World. New York: Vintage, 1997. Print. 
Saidazimova, Gulnoza. “Islam: Turkish Theologians Revise Hadith, To Mixed 
Reactions.” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. 18 Mar. 2008. Web. 04 Nov. 
2009.  
“Saudi Arabia.” CIA - The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency, 30 Nov. 2009. 
Web. 09 Dec. 2009.  
 “Secularism.” Cambridge Dictionary Online. Web. 04 Nov. 2009.  
Solmazturk, E. Haldun. "Turkish Secularism Is Democratic." Middle East Quarterly 15.3 
(2008): 67-70. Academic Search Complete. Web. 12 Apr. 2010. 
Somer, Murat. “Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the 
World, Muslims, and Secular Democracy.” Third World Quarterly 28 (2007): 
1271-289.  
Sutton, Philip W., and Stephen Vertigans. “The Established and Challenging Outsiders: 
Resurgent Islam in Secular Turkey.” Totalitarian Movements & Political 
Religions 3.1 (2002): 58-79. EBSCOhost. Web. 22 Oct. 2009.  
Tavernise, Sabrina. “A Religious Candidate is Ascendant in Turkey.” The New York 
Times. 28 Aug. 2009  
---. “Suit Seeks to Bar Party of Premier in Turkey.” The New York Times. 08 Apr. 2009  
---. “Turk With Islamic Ties is Elected President” The New York Times. 29 Aug. 2009  
---. “Turkish Presidential Pick Sets Up Clash, Again.” The New York Times. 14 Aug. 
2007  
Secularization and Islam in Turkey 39 
 
 “Turkey.” CIA - The World Factbook. 24 Feb. 2009. Central Intelligence Agency. 25 
Feb. 2009  
“Turkey and the Kurds.” The New York Times. 23 Nov. 2009. Web. 9 Dec. 2009.  
Yilmaz, Ihsan. “Secular Law and the Emergence of Unofficial Turkish Islamic Law.” 
Middle East Journal 56.1 (2002): 113-31. JSTOR. Web. 21 Oct. 2009.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Secularization and Islam in Turkey 40 
 
 
 
 
Works Referenced 
 
Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East. 4th ed. Boulder: Westview 
Press, 2009. 
Erdem, Gazi. “Religious Services in Turkey: From the Office of Seyhulislam to the 
Diyanet.” The Muslim World 98 (2008): 199-215.  
“European Court Confirms Ban on Turkish Islamic Party.” World Socialist Web Site. 31 
Mar. 2009  
Genel, Sema, and Karem Karaosmanoglu. “A New Islamic Individualism in Turkey: 
Headscarved Women in the City.” Turkish Studies 7 (2006): 437-88.  
Kalaycioglu, Ersin. “The Mystery of the Turban: Participation or Revolt?” Turkish 
Studies 6 (2005): 233-57.  
LaRoche, Guy. “Turkey vs EU.” Weblog post. A Fistful of Euros: European Opinion. 7 
June 2005. 9 July 2009  
Marshall, Gul A. “A Question of Compatibility: Feminism and Islam in Turkey.” 
Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 17.3 (2008): 223-38. EBSCOhost. Web. 
22 Oct. 2009.  
“Moves to Outlaw Turkish Islamic party.” BBC News. 31 Mar. 2009  
“The Ottomans.” Washington State University - Pullman, Washington. 31 Mar. 2009  
Secularization and Islam in Turkey 41 
 
Secor, Anna J. “The Veil and Urban Space in Istanbul: women's dress, mobility, and 
Islamic knowledge.” Gender, Place and Culture 9 (2002): 5-22.  
Shankland, David. Islam and Society in Turkey. England: Eothen, 1999.  
“Should Turkey Join the EU?” BBC News. 11 Oct. 2005. 9 July 2009.  
Taspinar, Omer. “Turkey's Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottoman and Kemalism.” 
Carnegie Papers (2008).  
“Turkey (01/09).” U.S. Department of State. 25 Feb. 2009  
“Turkey - Political Parties.” Country Studies. 31 Mar. 2009  
Wilhelm, Ian. “An Activist's Crusade Against Turkey's Head-Scarf Ban.” Chronicle of 
Philanthropy 20 (2008): 22.  
